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I show that virtually any model of decision making under uncertainty
is associated to a certain structure. This contains three fundamental in-
gredients: (1) The domain of the acts; (2) Another set, which is called
the set of models for the decision maker; and (3) The decision maker’s
information about the set of models (an algebra of subsets of the set of
models). A consequence of this finding is that that the decision maker’s
choices can be viewed as the outcome of a two-stage process. First, the
set of acts is mapped into a system of hypothetical bets on the set of
models. Then, the latter are ranked by the decision maker. I show that
this procedure can be thought of as describing a general form of analogical
reasoning. I also observe that the appearance of two diﬀerent sets implies
that the decision maker is uncertain about two diﬀerent objects and that
he may receive information about any of them. In particular, informa-
tion about the set of models aﬀects the decision maker’s ranking of the
available alternatives. In the sequel to this paper, I show that certain
natural information structures lead to an inherent inability of assigning
probabilities on the domain of the acts. In a formal sense, their properties
describe the idea of Knightian Uncertainty.
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1 Introduction to States, Models and Unitary
Equivalence
This is the first of a series of papers under the heading States, Models and Uni-
tary Equivalence. The goal of this work is to lay the foundations of a theory
of decision making under uncertainty, where Information plays an explicit and
substantial role. Ultimately, the theory is going to produce (normative) state-
ments of the sort, “If a decision maker has a certain information x, then he
should display behavior of type b(x)”, or (positive) statements of the sort, “if
a decision maker displays behavior of type y, then we can think of him as if
he followed a certain set of rules and his information were of type I(y)”. We
shall see that, in many instances, the content of such statements will be rather
novel. Among other things, we are going to see that (1) the old, but still vague,
idea of Knightian Uncertainty can be formally described by means of the prop-
erties of certain information structures; and that (2) behavior not conforming
to the classical Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) paradigm may emerge as a
“rational” response in the presence of those information structures.
The theory of decision making under uncertainty was first systematized by
the work of Savage [31]. Later, Prospect Theory [30] and the work of Schmeidler
[32] and Gilboa and Schmeidler [16] have brought about new ways of looking at
the problem. In particular, the widely observed violation of the Independence
Axiom (Ellsberg [7]) has been accommodated in the context of these theories.
However, in my opinion, a fully satisfactory explanation is still lacking. By itself,
this is a good enough reason for a thorough reconsideration of the foundations
of the theory. Moreover, the recent works on Unforeseen Contingencies (Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini [4]), on Dynamic Choice (Epstein and Schneider [8], Gul
and Pesendorfer [19]), on Case-Based decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler
[17], [18]) and on Ambiguity (Epstein and Zhang [9], Ghirardato, Maccheroni
and Marinacci [12], Nehring [29]) have brought about several new ideas which
make such a reconsideration all the more pressing. I believe that the explicit
recognition of the role played by Information in decision problems is a necessary
prerequisite for a successful systematization of these ideas. I hope to accomplish
this with the present work.
My exposition is motivated by three themes, which recur often in recent
works on decision theory. These are: (1) Analogical Reasoning; (2) Knightian
Uncertainty; and (3) Interpretation of Multiple Prior models. The common
thread running through these three themes is the idea of Information. Here, I
limit myself to summary hints. Needless to say, each of these themes will be
analyzed in great detail as the work progresses.
There is little doubt that analogical reasoning is one of the most prominent
forms of human thinking. Yet, classical theories of decision making neither
recognize its role explicitly nor provide a formalization of the notion. One of
my goals is to reach a formal definition and to study its implications for a
theory of decision making under uncertainty. Important work in this direction
has recently been done by Gilboa and Schmeidler ([17], [18]; see Section 4).
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Informally, the idea of Knightian Uncertainty designates those situations
characterized by the decision maker’s inherent inability to assign probabilities
to the various events. While thinking about these kind of situations has proved
remarkably useful, no formal characterization has been provided. I will do so in
the present work. I will show that certain information patterns lead, in a formal
sense, to the inability of using probabilities on the domain of the acts.
Many decision theorists favor Multiple Prior models. In Marinacci’s words,
“ ... The idea is simple and appealing. Since the decision maker does not have
enough information to form a meaningful single prior, he uses a set of priors
consisting of all those priors compatible with his limited information” (Mari-
nacci [27]). While the statement is very suggestive, it has no formal counterpart
within the existing theories. As a matter of fact, it is the concept of “informa-
tion” that does not find an appropriate formalization in those theories. In this
work, I explicitly introduce the concept of information structure, and study how
the decision maker’s choices vary as a function of the underlying information
structure. By doing so, I will be able, among other things, to justify statements
like Marinacci’s on a formal ground.
Roughly, each of these points will be dealt with in a separate paper in the
order given here.
To conclude this introduction, a few words about the series’ heading are in
order. The building block of my analysis is the recognition that virtually any
problem of decision making under uncertainty is associated to a certain structure
(Sections 6 and 7 in this paper). This structure contains three fundamental
ingredients. The first is the domain of the acts. After Savage, this is called the
set of states. The second is another set that can be thought of as the collection
of all the risky descriptions associated with the set of states (Sections 6 to 8).
This is called the set of models for the decision maker. The motivation for such
a terminology is provided by the construction in Section 5. It is a consequence
of this finding that the decision maker’s choices can be viewed as the outcome
of a process involving both the set of states and the set of models, and which
depends on the decision maker’s understanding of the latter. This brings us to
our third ingredient, which is a description of the decision maker’s information
about the set of models. Formally, it corresponds to the sub-algebra of subsets
generated by his information.
In the sequel to this paper, I study the decision maker’s behavior as a func-
tion of the information structure assigned on the set of models. In doing so, I
show that certain natural information structures lead to an inherent inability
of assigning probabilities on the domain of the acts. Hence, they are naturally
associated to the idea of Knightian Uncertainty. All of these information struc-
tures display a key property, namely, they produce a partition on the set of
models which is ergodic. The archetype of such a phenomenon is provided by
the unitary equivalence of normal operators on a Hilbert space, which is also
the main tool in some of the proofs.
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2 What this paper is about
2.1 Representation theorems
The theory of decision making under uncertainty is concerned with individuals
choosing among a set of available alternatives. The outcome associated to each
choice depends on the realization of a state of the world, s ∈ S, which is unknown
to the decision maker. A representation theorem is a statement of the form “if
the decision maker’s ranking of the alternatives, %, obeys certain rules, then
that ranking can be represented by means of a functional I : F+(S) → R+





Thus, the functional I represents the decision maker in the sense that we can
think of him as if he used I to rank the alternatives.
In this paper, I am going to show (Sections 6 and 7) that, in essentially any
axiomatic model, the functional I can be thought of as consisting of two parts
as in the diagram below.
F+(S)
κ−→ F+(M)
I & ↓ V
R+
Figure 2
The set M and the mapping κ are essentially the same in any model of decision
making, while the functional V varies with the axioms one imposes on the
decision maker’s preference relation.
What does this buy us? Recognizing that the process of decision making
can always be described as in the previous diagram generates advantages on two
fronts. First, it allows us to provide new interpretations for existing theories.
Second, it shows that the structure involved in the process of decision making
is richer than previously thought (compare Fig.1 to Fig.2). This paves the way
for a reconsideration of both the meaning of the term “Uncertainty” and the
role played by “Information” in decision problems.
1Here F+(S) denotes the set of nonnegative (measurable) real-valued functions on S, and
R+ denotes the nonnegative real numbers.
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2.2 Analogical reasoning
On the front of novel interpretations, the results contained in this paper allow
us to link existing axiomatic theories to the idea of analogical reasoning. In
Section 5.1, I give a formal definition of what it means to solve a problem by
analogy with another. The idea is simple and intuitive. Suppose that a decision
maker has already ranked a set of alternatives B. Now, he faces the problem
of ranking a new set of alternatives A. The idea is that he would map the new
alternatives into the old ones, and then use the past ranking to order the new
ones.
Of course, the process of analogical reasoning can be much more sophisti-
cated than just described. In general, we would expect a decision maker to use
all of his past experience to solve the problem at hand. In Section 5.3, I build a
model of decision making that tries to capture this intuition, and show that it
is described by the diagram in Figure 2. That is, it displays the same structure
as any axiomatic model of decision making. Thus, those models can now be
reinterpreted in terms of analogical reasoning, and new insights can be gained
from this perspective.
2.3 Uncertainty and information
Figure 2 states that the process of decision making involves two sets: the domain
of the acts S and another set M . What is this set? A remarkable feature of the
representation theorems of Sections 6 and 7 is the result that M can always be
represented in the same way. Namely, it is a set of probabilistic descriptions of
the domain of the acts (see also Section 8). Thus, the decision maker’s ranking
emerges as the outcome of two types of assessments. Assessments about the like-
lihood of the various states and about the likelihood of the various probabilistic
descriptions.
In the sequel to this paper, I argue that the simultaneous presence of S
and M reflects the existence of two conceptually diﬀerent types of uncertainty
confronting the decision maker: uncertainty about which state obtains and un-
certainty about “how the world works”. In doing so, I depart from the classical
point of view (Savage [31], Ch. 2) which focuses only on uncertainty of the
first type. Having realized that a decision maker can be uncertain about two
diﬀerent objects leads to the obvious observation that he can obtain valuable
information about any of those. Hence, one is led to inquire about how infor-
mation about M aﬀects the decision maker’s ranking of the alternatives. This
study is very much in the spirit of the interpretation in terms of analogical rea-
soning proposed above. In a way, it corresponds to the study of how a decision
maker’s experience/knowledge aﬀects his perception of the problem he faces.
2.3.1 States, Models and Unitary Equivalence II
Ellsberg’s experiment (Section 10 in this paper) is a stripped down example
that brings to light the fact that information about the set M might aﬀect the
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decision maker’s choices. The general problem is the main theme in part II of
this work. The main finding is that certain natural information structures on
M produce an inherent inability of using probabilities on S. In a precise sense,
these capture the vague idea of Knightian Uncertainty, which thus becomes
suitable of formal analysis. In this context, behavior of Ellsberg’s type is shown
to emerge as the outcome of purely informational phenomenona.
3 The setting
Before moving to the main issues dealt with in this work, a few words about
the setting of decision making under uncertainty are in order. The goal is not
to refresh the readers’ memory, but rather to make some observations about
the nature of the objects of study. Specifically, I am going to argue that, if
we aim for theories of decision making that are truly testable, then there can
be no ambiguity as to what those objects are. We shall see that important
consequences stem from the considerations of this section.
The setting of decision making under uncertainty is as follows. An individual,
the decision maker, has to rank alternatives from a set F . Given an element s
in a set S, each alternative f ∈ F produces an outcome, f(s) = x ∈ X. Hence,
elements in F can be viewed as mappings S → X, and the decision maker has
to rank those. Given the decision maker’s preference relation over outcomes,
the problem is nontrivial if the decision maker does not know which element in
S obtains. Summarizing, we have the following objects:
(A) A set S. In Savage’s terminology, this is the set of states.
(B) A set of outcomes X.
(C) A set of alternatives F . This is a collection of mappings S → X, and
elements in F are called acts.
In all axiomatic theories, such a description is enriched by introducing a
fourth object. Namely,
(D) A fixed field, Σ, of subsets of S.
Most theories of decision making are “choice-based". That is, the theory’s
only datum is the decision maker’s ranking of the alternatives and, in turn, all
the theory’s prescriptions translate into assessments about the decision maker’s
ranking. Since such a ranking is observable, this guarantees that the theory is
testable. If we adhere to this principle, then there can be no ambiguity as to
what the above objects are.
To begin, the set of states S should be deprived of any metaphysical meaning.
S should be viewed as the domain of the acts. Both the decision maker and any
outside observer have to be able to agree as to what S is. A similar consideration
can be made about X and F .2
Of course, this is not to say that the decision maker’s ranking of the alter-
natives depends on S alone. For instance, if we think in terms of reasoning by
2The necessity that S be objectively given has been stressed in a recent paper by Karni
[24].
6
analogy, we must admit that the decision maker might have information regard-
ing another set, say C, and know that C and S are related in a certain way.
Then, he can use that information when it comes to ranking the elements in F .
It goes without saying that phenomena of this sort are not only possible, but
also that a comprehensive theory of decision making should certainly account
for them. I would like to stress, however, that both the existence of a certain re-
lation between C and S (known to the decision maker) and the decision maker’s
information about C are, generally speaking, non-observable.
The final observation regards the field Σ. In axiomatic theories, the role of Σ
is to transform acts into measurable functions (by using a utility function on the
outcome space). This is clearly a necessary step for theories aiming for some kind
of an expected utility criterion. Here, the issue is about the meaning of Σ. One
view might be that Σ reflects the decision maker’s information about S. This
is patently illegitimate if we want the theory to be testable as such information
is unobservable. If anything, it should be derived from the decision maker’s
ranking.3 However, Σ can be given on objective meaning: it can be defined
as the coarsest field which makes all the acts measurable. This is completely
determined by F , which is objectively given. Moreover, this does not imply
anything about the decision maker’s information about S. Throughout this
work, we will stick with this interpretation.
These considerations about the meaning of Σ might appear redundant. To
my knowledge, no axiomatic theory has ever treated, at least explicitly, Σ as
reflecting the decision maker’s information about S. Nevertheless, some confu-
sion seems to be present in various debates. For instance, consider the debate
surrounding the three-color urn experiment of Ellsberg. A well-known argument
dismisses the choices not conforming to the SEU paradigm as irrational since
they seemingly violate an elementary form of consistency of logical reasoning.
By adhering to this argument, however, one implicitly assumes that the decision
maker uses a separated field on the domain of the bets. Specifically, one pre-
sumes that the set of blue balls and the set of green balls are measurable events
from the viewpoint of the decision maker (and, as such, suitable for evaluation
by means of a probability measure), while there is nothing guaranteeing that
this is indeed the case. A similar observation can be made for the no-arbitrage
argument of de Finetti or even for the Bayesian argument stating that a decision
maker described by a prior over a set of priors is equivalent, from an observa-
tional viewpoint, to a decision maker described by a single prior. Hoping that
the examples have at least convinced the reader that I might have a point, I
will leave it at that, and return to it in subsequent sections.
In the next section, I am going to set X = R, the real line. This is fully
justified when one imposes axioms on preferences which guarantee the existence
of a utility function on the outcome space. I will do so in Section 6. In addition,
for reasons that will become clear later in the paper (Section 9), I am going to
define Σ as a σ-algebra, and not simply an algebra.
3The work on Ambiguity (Epstein and Zhang [9], Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci
[12], Nehring [29], Stinchcombe [35]) can be interpreted as replying exactly to this need.
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4 Reasoning by Analogy
Analogy is the recognition that one thing A (a phenomenon, a problem, etc.) is
like another thing B and that, therefore, consequences (inferences, explanations,
solutions, etc.) that can be drawn from A can be drawn from B as well. Analogy
is a reasoning process that is so pervasive in human life that can be viewed as one
of the cornerstones of human thought. In the Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind
[6], Analogy is recognized as, “... an important kind of thinking contributing
to such cognitive tasks as explanation, planning and decision making (Paul
Thagard)”. Because of this, it is not surprising that the concept of Analogy has
been an object of philosophical reflection since ancient times.4
As of today, research on the concept of Analogy and on the process of ana-
logical reasoning has become increasingly important in the study of Artificial
Intelligence (see, for instance, [11]). Again, this is not surprising given the
nature of the subject. What is surprising is that classical theories of decision
making under uncertainty do not explicitly recognize the role played by analog-
ical reasoning.
Theories of decision making under uncertainty are concerned with explain-
ing/guiding the behavior of individuals who have to choose a course of action
in an uncertain environment. It is indisputable that, in a large variety of situ-
ations, individuals perceive this as a “new” problem, in the sense that they do
not have a “ready-made” solution for it. In such situations, individuals tend to
rely on their past experience, that is, they recall solutions that they gave in the
past and try to “adapt” them to the new circumstances. It is precisely these
types of processes that are unaccounted for by classical theories.
In recent years, Gilboa and Schmeidler started a research program (see, for
instance, the comprehensive [17] and the more recent [18]) aiming to fill, at
least in part, this gap. Their Case-Based Theory of Decisions can be viewed as
a specialization to a decision theoretic setting of the idea of Case-Based Rea-
soning. This is founded on the intuition that the problems one faces are often
similar to problems encountered in the past and, therefore, that past solutions
may be of use in current situations. The idea of Case-Based Reasoning becomes
especially powerful when the reasoning method is coupled with a learning par-
adigm: solutions given to new problems update the case base thus producing
new strategies to attack new problems. Strictly speaking, Case-Based Reason-
ing refers to problems based on single-domain cases.5 As such, it is a special
case of Analogical Reasoning that allows for the use of past cases from diﬀerent
domains and goes even beyond that.
In the next section, I propose a definition of Reasoning by Analogy that
is tailored to a setting of decision making under uncertainty. Building on this
definition, I construct a model of decision making which accounts for the pos-
sibility that a decision maker might choose a course of action based on past
4To give just one example, reflections on the concept recur several times in St. Thomas
from the Summa Theologica to the De potentia to the De veritates.
5Roughly speaking, a set of cases pertain to a single domain if they are describable by
means of the same set of parameters.
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or even on only potential cases from diﬀerent domains. The model contains
several ingredients that combine to give rise to a certain structure. In Section
6, I show that one of the most general axiomatic models of decision making we
know of (see [12]) displays the same structure as the model built on the idea of
analogical reasoning. In a way, that structure had always been there, and the
task accomplished by Theorem 2 (Section 6) is that of bringing that structure
to light. Later, I show that the result holds for axiomatizations weaker than
that in [12].
5 Models and Analogies
5.1 Simple analogies
Suppose that a decision maker has to rank a set of bets, F , regarding the
meteorological conditions in Siberia (S) over the month of July in a certain
year. Lacking any direct experience of the weather in Siberia, our decision
maker might try to “translate” this problem into a problem he is more familiar
with. For instance, the meteorological conditions over the same month in his
own state, which, we suppose, is California (C). In other words, let us assume
that the decision maker has some information about C, described by a certain
σ-algebra C, and that, on the basis of this information, he is able to rank all the
bets in
F+(C) = {f : C → R+ | f bounded and C-measurable}
Let us denote by %C the decision maker’s ranking of the bets in F+(C). Now,
our decision maker wants to use this knowledge, and possibly the knowledge
that Siberia and California are at a diﬀerent latitude, longitude, that they are
both on the Pacific, etc., to solve the problem he faces, namely that of ranking
the bets in F .
To begin, like in the previous section, define Σ as the coarsest σ-algebra
which makes all the bets in F measurable, and (to simplify the exposition) set
F = F+(S) = {f : S → R+ | f bounded and Σ-measurable}
Next, we want to formalize the idea that the problem of ordering F+(S) can be
“translated” into the problem of ordering F+(C) (which has already been solved
by the decision maker with the ordering %C). The task boils down to identifying
two requirements. First, it must be the case that each bet fi ∈ F+(S) can be
identified to a bet φi ∈ F+(C). In other words, there must exist a mapping
ν : F+(S)→ F+(C). Second, it must be the case that, modulo the renaming of
the bets produced by the mapping ν, the objects F+(S) and ν(F+(S)) ⊂ F+(C)
are the same. This means that if there exists a certain relation between any two
bets f, g ∈ F+(S), then this relation must be preserved once the mapping ν is
applied. That is, it must be the case that the mapping ν preserves whatever
structure is associated with F+(S). In our context, F+(S) is an aﬃne space of
measurable mappings. Hence, the requirement that ν be structure-preserving
translates into the demand that ν displays the following properties
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(i) aﬃnity: ν(αf + βg) = αν(f) + βν(g), α, β ∈ R+
(ii) normality: fn % f =⇒ ν(fn)% ν(f), n ∈ N.
That is, if a bet h ∈ F+(S) is a combination of two other bets, f, g ∈ F+(S),
then we want ν(h) to be an analogous combination of the bets ν(f) and ν(g);
and if a collection of bets {fn} in F+(S) approximates a bet f ∈ F+(S), then we
want the collection {ν(fn)} to approximate the bet ν(f). Mappings like ν are
called kernels or generalized transition probabilities, and will play an important
role throughout this work (for more about kernels, see Appendix A.5.1).
Once F+(S) and F+(C) are made to correspond to each other by means
of a kernel ν : F+(S) → F+(C), then the problem of ordering F+(S) can be
solved by setting
f % g iff ν(f) %C ν(g)
We summarize the content of this discussion in the following definition.6
Definition 1 Let (S,Σ) and (C, C) be two measurable spaces. Let d be a deci-
sion maker who displays choices <S and <C on F+(S) and F+(C), respectively.
We say that the problem (F+(C),%C) is a model for ranking the bets in F+(S)
if there exists a kernel ν : F+(S)→ F+(C) such that
f <S g iff ν(f) <C ν(g)
We say that the problems (F+(C),%C) and (F+(S),%S) are analogous if the
kernel is a bijection.
The definition makes it clear that the concepts of model and analogy pertain
to a decision maker. In other words, one can exhibit two decision makers, d1
and d2, for whom the problems on S and C are analogous but the analogy is
realized by diﬀerent kernels as well as a third decision maker for whom there
exist no analogy between the two problems.
5.2 Kernels and models. An example
As a general matter, the possibility of solving a problem, say ordering F+(S), by
analogy with another problem, say (F+(C),%C), corresponds to the existence
of an aﬃne mapping ν : F+(S) → RC+ with the property that range(ν) ⊆
F+(C). As the reader has probably already realized, the existence of such a
mapping depends crucially on the relation between the two σ-algebras C and Σ
or, equivalently, between C and the set of bets F oﬀered to the decision maker.
It is important that the reader keep in mind that the issue, far from being
merely technical, is a very substantial one. The σ-algebra C on C describes (by
assumption) the decision maker’s understanding of C. This is the same as saying
that the decision maker’s knowledge is described by F+(C). Now, suppose that
the decision maker attempts to translate his problem into (F+(C),%C), and
that this produces a certain (non-constant) aﬃne mapping ν : F+(S) → RC+.
6Our definition is in the spirit of [10]. The latter has been criticized in [3]. See also [28]
and [11] for more on the debate.
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Suppose further that C is so coarse that this mapping does not satisfy the
condition range(ν˜) ⊂ F+(C). In a manner of speaking, what happens is that
F+(C) is not big enough to accommodate all the functions in F+(S). This
situation has a very transparent meaning. Knowledge of (F+(C),%C) is not
enough to solve the problem at hand. Equivalently, (F+(C),%C) cannot be a
model for ordering the bets in F+(S).
To illustrate the point further, consider the following example. Let S =
[0, 1] be equipped with the Lebesgue σ-algebra, and let C be a two-point set,
C = {c1, c2}. A mapping (see A.5.1) ci 7−→ µi ∈ ∆(S) defines a mapping
κ : F+([0, 1]) → RC+ in a way that each bet f on [0, 1] is associated to the







Clearly, κ is aﬃne.
Suppose that C is equipped with the trivial algebra {∅, C}. Then, while
the set of real-valued mappings on C is isomorphic (in a set-theoretic sense)
to the plane, the set of measurable functions on C consists of the constants
only. If µ1 6= µ2, then it is an easy matter to check that uncountably many
measurable functions on [0, 1] are associated to vectors whose first coordinate
diﬀers from the second, that is to non-constant functions on C. Since these are
not measurable, we see that range(κ) * F+(C).
What drives the example is that while C is a two-point set it behaves, from
the viewpoint of the measurable properties, as a one-point space. This property
is only seemingly artificial. In fact, many natural quotient spaces display it. We
will see examples of this sort when, in the second part, we study the eﬀect of
diﬀerent information structures on the decision maker’s behavior.
5.3 More models
Here, we want to push the above line of reasoning further. We want to allow
for the possibility that our decision maker uses more than one model to solve
the problem at hand, that of ordering the bets in F+(S). For instance, when
it comes to forecasting the weather in Siberia, the decision maker might use,
not only his knowledge of the weather in California, but also his knowledge of
the weather in Nevada as well as that of any relation between the weather in
California and Nevada, and so forth. A bit more formally, let M be the set of
models for our decision maker. Each model m ∈ M is a pair (F+(Cm),%Cm),
where (Cm, Cm) is some measurable space, and there is given a kernel κm :
F+(S)→ F+(Cm). Each model produces, by means of the associated kernel, an
ordering of the bets in F+(S), and, generally speaking, diﬀerent models produce
diﬀerent orderings. Then, the decision maker uses this collection of orderings
to come up, if possible, with a solution for his problem. Just like before, the
decision maker’s understanding of M is described by two ingredients: (a) the
set of bets on M that the he knows how to order; and (b) the way he orders
them. The first is described by a σ-field,M, of subsets ofM or, equivalently, by
the set F+(M) of nonnegative, boundedM-measurable functions. The second,
by a binary relation, %M , on F+(M). Intuitively, one might think of the latter
11
as representing the decision maker’s assessments of which model is more likely
to apply.
To simplify the exposition, let us assume that, for each m ∈M , the ordering
%Cm is represented by a functional jm : F+(Cm) → R+. Such an assumption
could be easily dispensed with, but at the cost of introducing a fairly cumber-
some notation. Since here we are concerned more with the basic ideas rather
than with formalities, the simplification is, in fact, harmless.
Following the idea outlined above, each function f ∈ F+(S) is now associated
to the function φf ∈ RM+ which at point m ∈M takes the value
φf (m) = jm(f)
In a sense, the function φf is a description of the bet f when all models are
taken into account.
Let κ : F+(S) → RM+ be the function defined by f 7−→ φf . At this point,
just like in 5.2, we have two possibilities. Either range(κ) ⊂ F+(M) or the
inclusion does not hold. In the first case, the decision maker solves his problem
by setting
f % g iff κ(f) %M κ(g)
In the second, he concludes that his understanding of (his information about)
M is not enough to solve the problem at hand, and must rely on other consid-
erations.7
On the other hand, if it happens that range(κ) ⊂ F+(M) then the problem
of ranking the bets in F+(S) splits into two parts. First, the mapping κ takes
f into κ(f), then κ(f) is ranked by means of %M . If to fix ideas, we assume
that %M be itself represented by a functional V : F+(M) → R+, then we can
summarize the discussion by means of the following diagram
F+(S)
κ−→ F+(M)
I & ↓ V
R+
that is
f % g iff I(f) ≥ I(g)
where I : F+(S)→ R+ is defined by I = V ◦ κ.
We conclude the section with a couple of remarks about the process of de-
cision making that emerges from our construction. First, we suggest another
possible interpretation of this process, which exploits the fact (noted in Section
4) that Case-Based Reasoning is a special case of Reasoning by Analogy. Ac-
cording to this point of view, each element in m ∈ M can be thought of as a
7The last sentence is deliberately vague. Roughly, it means that the decision maker has to
rely on considerations which are “nonmeasurable” with respect to his information about M .
We study this problem in part III.
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case or, more generally, as a collection of cases on the same domain. Then, the
associated ordering on F+(S) can be thought of as the ordering suggested by
the “experience” m and by the mapping κm. The set M is the collection of all
such experiences and the fieldM describes the decision maker’s view of how all
these experiences (and the associated orderings on F+(S)) fit together.
We would like to emphasize, however, that in general M may contain, not
only the cases actually experienced by the decision maker, but also hypothetical
cases and even cases the decision maker has never thought of. As a matter of
fact, the field M and the functional V determine which cases in M aﬀect the
decision maker’s ordering of the acts. For instance, suppose that A ⊂ M is
a subset of cases that the decision maker has never thought of and that, as
such, are not going to aﬀect his behavior. Then, with V defined by means of a
probability measure P onM, the condition P (A) = 0 would convey that such
cases play no role.8
6 Choice-based foundations for models and analo-
gies
The whole discussion above was heuristic. Some readers might find our defin-
itions of model and analogy reasonable, others might be sceptical about them.
The same can be said about the model of decision making which we outlined
at the end of the previous section. It is a fact, nonetheless, that such a model
admits a rigorous, choice-based, foundation.
Let F0 denote the set of simple Σ-measurable acts and Fc that of constant
acts. Let % be a preference relation on F0 satisfying the following axioms.
A1 % is complete and transitive.
A2 (C-independence) For all f, g ∈ F0 and h ∈ Fc and for all α ∈ (0, 1)
f Â g ⇐⇒ αf + (1− α)h Â αg + (1− α)h
A3 (Archimedean property) For all f, g, h ∈ F0, if f Â g and g Â h then
∃α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αf + (1− α)h Â g and g Â βf + (1− β)h.
A4 (Monotonicity) For all f, g ∈ F0, f(s) % g(s) =⇒ f % g.
A5 (Non-degeneracy) ∃x, y ∈ X such that x Â y.
Recently, Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [12] have shown that such
preferences are completely described by the functional I : F+(S) → R defined
by









where C is a weak*-compact set of probability measures, α : F+(S)→ [0, 1] and
u is a utility function on the prize space. It is readily seen that as special cases,
8The converse to this statement is not true. P (A) = 0 does not mean that the decision
maker did not think of cases in A.
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one obtains α-maxmin expected utility (∀α ∈ [0, 1]), Choquet expected utility
and Subjective expected utility.
With less emphasis on the form of the functional I and more on the structure
that emerges from the theorem, we can reformulate the result as follows (the
proof is in Appendix A.6).
Theorem 2 Given a preference relation satisfying Axioms 1 to 5 there exist
(i) a measurable space (M,M)
(ii) an aﬃne mapping κ : F+(S)→ F+(M)
(iii) a functional V : F+(M)→ R
such that
f <S g iff V ◦ κ(f) ≥ V ◦ κ(g)
Moreover, one can take M = C ⊂ ∆(S) and κ is defined by f 7−→ φf , where φf





Remark 3 A utility function on the prize space, u : X → R+, produces a
mapping from the set of acts into F+(S) given by f 7−→ u◦f . In the statement of
the theorem, we have identified an act with its image in F+(S). This is harmless
and simplifies the notation. We will stick with this convention throughout the
paper.
The theorem says that such a general model of decision making displays the
same structure as the model we proposed at end of last section. In light of
this observation, those discussions now provide a possible interpretation for the
model emerging from Theorem 2. In other words, we can think of elements in
M as “models” for the decision maker and of the functional I as consisting of
two parts as in the diagram below
F+(S)
κ−→ F+(M,M)
I & ↓ V
R+
The first part is the mapping κ, which takes a bet f ∈ F+(S) into a function
φf ∈ F+(M). At model m ∈ M , φf takes a real value, φf (m), which can be
interpreted as the evaluation of bet f corresponding to that model. All such
possible evaluations are, then, collected together and lead to a single evaluation
of the bet f by means of the functional V .
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7 More general preferences
In this section, we are going to show that theorems of the above type hold for
a much wider class of preferences. In our view, axioms A1 and A4 are very
mild assumptions (at least from a positive viewpoint). Axiom A5 serves only to
make things interesting. For this reason, we are going to provide representation
theorems that, with respect to the previous one, drop either axiom A2 or axiom
A3 or both. In Theorem 4 below, we drop only axiom A2 (C-independence) while
maintaining the other axioms. This case is of special interest since it includes
the class of Variational Preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [26])
which appears in important applications in Macroeconomics and in Finance
(Hansen and Sargent [21]). From a more theoretical perspective, Ghirardato,
Maccheroni and Marinacci [13] have shown that C-independence is the crucial
property guaranteeing the complete separation between utility and “beliefs” (see
[13] with regard to this terminology). Because of this, preferences satisfying A1
to A5 enjoy special properties, and are termed invariant biseparable preferences.
Then, our Theorem 4 shows that the properties of the previous section hold
beyond such a class. As a matter of fact, the combination of Theorem 4 and
Theorem 2 show that they hold for all biseparable preferences (not necessarily
invariant) and beyond that. The latter property appears, perhaps more clearly,
in Corollary 5, which further extends the validity of Theorem 4. Finally, we
show that our conclusions extend beyond the class of Archimedean preferences.
By this, we mean that the property in axiom A3 fails not only for general acts,
but for constant acts too. In such a case, there exists no real-valued utility on
the prize space.
We begin by dropping the axiom of C-independence.
Theorem 4 Let % be a preference relation on F0. If % satisfies A1 and A3 to
A5, then there exist
(i) a measurable space (M,M)
(ii) an aﬃne mapping κ : F+(S)→ F+(M)
(iii) a functional V : F+(M)→ R
such that
f <S g iff V ◦ κ(f) ≥ V ◦ κ(g)
Moreover, one can take M = ∆(S) and κ is defined by f 7−→ φf , where φf is





The proof is in Appendix A. 7. Just as in the proof of Theorem 2, we use
the existence of a utility function on the prize space. Axioms A1 and A3 to
A5 restricted to constants still guarantee the existence of a utility. However,
because we have dropped A2, the utility is not necessarily linear. Obviously,
the latter property might be restored by requiring that A2 hold for constants
only (axiom LC, below). The same observation applies to the corollary below.
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The next corollary further extends the validity of the previous theorem. In
addition, it makes it clear that the class of preferences it applies to is wider
than the class of biseparable preferences of Ghirardato and Marinacci [15]. The
following axioms were introduced in [15], Section 3.
CE (Certainty Equivalents) For all f ∈ F0, ∃xf ∈ X : f ∼ xf .
AAC (Archimedean Axiom for constants) For all x, y, z ∈ X, if x Â y Â z
then ∃α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αx+ (1− α)z Â y Â βx+ (1− β)z.
Corollary 5 Let % be a preference relation on F0. If % satisfies A1, A4, A5,
CE and ACC, then the same statement as in the previous theorem holds.
Notice that the class of preferences dealt with in the corollary is wider than
that in Theorem 4. In fact, axiom AAC is weaker than A3 in that it refers to
constant acts only, and axioms A3 and A4 imply axiom CE but the converse
is not true (see [15], Section 3). We also observe that, as a special case, the
same statement holds if we replace CE with the continuity assumption S1 in
[15], Section 3.3. For, in such a case, Lemma 29 in [15] implies that axiom CE is
automatically satisfied. Such preferences are not necessarily biseparable in that
they do not have to satisfy the assumption of Binary Comonotonic Independence
in [15], Section 3.3.
We now move to the non-Archimedean case. We first introduce the follow-
ing axiom, which weakens A2 in that it requires that independence holds for
elements in the prize space only.
LC For all x, y, z ∈ X and for all α ∈ (0, 1)
x Â y ⇐⇒ αx+ (1− α)z Â αy + (1− α)z
Given axiom LC, the extension of the above results to the non-Archimedean
case obtains along similar lines. In fact, axioms A1, A4 and LC guarantee the
existence of a utility representing the ordering on the prize space. Since we gave
up the Archimedean axiom, such a utility is not valued in the reals but rather in
an ordered vector space OV ∗ (see Hausner [22]). Without loss, we can assume
that the latter is a Banach space. Hence, acts can be identified to mappings
from S to this Banach space. By axiom CE, we can define an operator from
such mappings to OV ∗, which represents the decision maker’s ordering of the
acts. Finally, we define κ and V just like we did in the previous theorems. The
only diﬀerence is that the integrals of the previous theorems as well as V are
now OV ∗-valued (the integrals are, in fact, Bochner integrals). Summarizing,
we have
Theorem 6 Let % be a preference relation on F0. If % satisfies A1, A4, A5,
CE and LC, then there exist
(o) a utility function u : X → OV ∗, where OV ∗ is a Banach space.
(i) a measurable space (M,M)
(ii) an aﬃne mapping κ : F0(S,OV ∗)→ F (M,OV ∗) 9
9F0(S,OV ∗) is the set of simple measurable mappings S → OV ∗ and F (M,OV ∗) that of
measurable mappings M → OV ∗.
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(iii) a mapping V : F (M,OV ∗)→ OV ∗
such that
f <S g iff V ◦ κ(f) ≥ V ◦ κ(g)
Moreover, one can take M = ∆(S) and κ is defined by f 7−→ φf , with φf being





where the integral on the RHS is a Bochner integral.
8 Comments on the representation
The structure which emerges from the representation theorems contains several
ingredients. A closer look at it is, now, in order. The theorems state that we can
think of the decision process as consisting of two stages: first, the decision maker
maps the bets F+(S) into F+(M) by means of κ, then he orders F+(M), hence
F+(S), by means of V . To begin, we must point out that it is not observable
whether or not the decision process actually occurs in this way. Pictorially, what
is observable is only the diagonal arrow in the diagram at the end of Section 6.
Yet, as we have noted already, the content of the above theorems is precisely
that no choice-based theory can dismiss this possibility. In other words, we can
always think of the decision process as consisting of the two stages described
above. This brings us to an interesting issue. If we must admit that the decision
process involves two sets, S and M , then we must admit that there are two
sources of uncertainty as well as two potential sources of information (about S
and about M). We comment on this in 8.2 below. Before that, however, it is
useful to spend a few words about the nature of the space M . Since we have
already argued that the decision maker can be uncertain about M , it would be
good to know what this uncertainty is about.
8.1 M is a set of risky descriptions
A notable feature emerging from the theorems of the previous sections is that
the set of models for the decision maker can always be described by means of the
set of all probability measures on S. In this regard, the reader should notice that
while this result appears in Theorem 2 as a consequence of the representation
theorem given in [12], the same result in Theorems 4 and 6 is independent of
that representation. Of course, the representation of M as a set of probability
measures on S is by no means unique. Any set that is measurably isomorphic
with it will do as well. Yet, the very possibility of describing it by means
of such probabilities is of special significance for a theory of decision making.
It states that M can always be thought of as the collection of all probabilistic
descriptions associated with the domain of the acts. There is more to it, however.
An additional insight comes from the observation that the mapping κ, which
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links S and M in the theorems, can always be defined in the same way. That
allows us to think of each element inM as describing an ordering of the acts (on
S) conforming to the Expected Utility criterion. To see this, just recall that if f
is an act and m is a model, then f is evaluated by
R
fdm in correspondence of
model m. In the spirit of the Knightian distinction between risk and ambiguity,
we can then think of M as the collection of all risky descriptions of the problem
faced by the decision maker.
8.2 Two types of information
No matter how one interprets M , it is a set that is linked to S by a certain
relation. Moreover, the decision maker takes this relation into account when it
comes to ordering the bets in F+(S).
Generally speaking, the decision maker is uncertain about both S and M .10
In part II, we will argue that these are uncertainties of inherently diﬀerent types.
For now, we want to limit ourselves to a simpler observation. Since the decision
maker is uncertain about two objects, he can get information about any of them.
In particular, if he gets some information about M , then this could aﬀect his
ranking of the bets F+(S), because M and S are linked to each other. For
instance, in our example above, the decision maker’s forecast about the weather
in Siberia is going to be aﬀected by any information that he obtains about the
weather in California or about the relation between the weather in California
and that in Nevada. We shall see (part II) that the study of how information
about M translates into information about S is a nontrivial issue. For future
reference, it is useful to summarize the content of this discussion in the following
schematic way
Two sets → Two types of uncertainty → Two types of information
8.3 The space M. The normative use of the model
M emerges from the theorems not only as a set, but also as a space, that is a set
equipped with a certain structure (the Borel tribe described in the theorems).
Such a structure represents the decision maker’s understanding of the collection
of risky descriptions associated with S. This is a crucial ingredient. Ultimately,
the decision maker has to fit together all those descriptions, and combine them
so to generate a unique ordering of the acts. It is, then, intuitively clear that the
decision maker’s understanding of M plays a crucial role in determining such
an outcome. This brings us to our next observation, which regards the ability
of using the model emerging from Theorems 2, 4 and 6 in a normative way.
10 It is interesting to observe that the extreme case of “certainty about the model” implies
SEU theory. In fact, the case of certainty about the model corresponds to the kernel defined
by the constant mapping m 7−→ µ ∈ ∆(S), ∀m ∈ M . Hence, for f ∈ F+(S), we have
f 7−→ φf (m) =
U
fdµ, ∀m ∈ M . Therefore, any V compatible with the representation
theorems implies V ◦ k(f) =
U
fdµ. As we shall see, this is not the only case compatible with
SEU.
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If we are going to use the model in a normative way, then the algebra on
M represents (by assumption) the decision maker’s understanding of the set of
all risky situations. This raises an important issue. To see it, let us go back to
the representation theorems. In those theorems, M emerges equipped with the
Borel tribe generated by the weak*-topology. This is precisely the algebra that
guarantees that the mapping κ is measurable in the sense of Appendix A.5.1.
Or, if we go back to our discussion about Reasoning by Analogy, this is what
guarantees that the decision maker’s understanding of the set M is enough to
order the bets in F+(S). From this viewpoint, the theorems should be inter-
preted as saying that if the decision maker’s information on M is described by
the Borel tribe generated by the weak*-topology on M , then the bets in F+(S)
are ordered according to the functional V ◦ κ. Immediately, one notices that
the condition about the measurable structure of M is, in fact, an informational
requirement. That is, it states that the decision maker’s information about M
must be of a certain type. One obvious question is, how demanding is such
a requirement?. A look at the properties of the Borel tribe generated by the
weak*-topology tells us that this is not a light condition. For instance, it implies
that, on the basis of his information, the decision maker is able to distinguish
between any two models. In other words, given any two models, m1 and m2, the
decision maker can always construct (by using his information only) a statistical
test which allows him to reject/accept the hypothesis that the true model is m1
and not m2.
In part II, we will show that this is precisely the necessary condition allowing
a (Bayesian) decision maker to summarize both his uncertainty about M and
his uncertainty about S by means of a single probability measure on S. We will
also show that this condition is not satisfied in many instances. In particular,
we will show that it is not so in Ellsberg’s experiments.
9 A Borel Setting
This section is a (very) brief digression. Here, I introduce some additional
assumptions guaranteeing, among other things, that all the priors in the model
are countably additive. While these assumptions play a role only in the sequel,
it is economically convenient to introduce them following the detailed exposition
of the other axioms contained in Sections 6 and 7. In this way, the reader would
have a clear picture of the model that I am going to be using in the remaining
part of the work.
From now on, we are going to focus on preferences satisfying axioms A1 to
A5. This choice allows us to avoid a certain amount of tedious qualifications
and cumbersome notations. Nevertheless, as the reader can readily check, all
the theorems that we state in the sequel extend with minor qualifications to the
more general classes of preferences dealt with in Section 7. We also introduce
three additional assumptions which we maintain throughout the work, unless
otherwise stated.11 The first two are about the measurable space (S,Σ). We
11A notable exception is the section devoted to the case of a finite domain of the acts (see
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assume that S has the cardinality of the continuum and that (S,Σ) is a standard
Borel space (see A.9 for a definition). The Isomorphism Theorem for Borel
spaces (see A.9) implies that, without any loss, the reader can think of (S,Σ)
as [0, 1] equipped with the Lebesgue σ-algebra Λ. The third assumption is
on preferences, and naturally complements the previous two. We assume that
preferences satisfy the Axiom of Monotone Continuity (see A.9). In this case,
all the measures appearing in Theorem 2 are countably additive (see A.9). For
a discussion about this axiom the reader is referred to [2], where the Axiom was
originally introduced, and to [34].
We have two main motivations for introducing these assumptions. One is
that we want to re-examine Savage theory in light of the study of Information
we will pursue in part II. Savage theory demands that the set S be infinite,
which explains, at least in part, the assumption about the cardinality of S.
The second and more important perhaps, is that the study of the uncountable
standard Borel case leads, as we shall see, to a deeper understanding of the
finite case. In this regard, the reader should remind him/herself that a finite set
equipped with the power set is a standard Borel space. Of course, when moving
the uncountable case, one cannot retain both the power set and the property
of being standard Borel, and it is a debatable matter, to say the least, which
of these two representations is the appropriate extension of the finite case. In
fact, there are very good and well-known reasons to prefer the latter. We will
examine this problem in part II.
We conclude this discussion by observing that under the new assumptions
the mapping κ of Theorem 2 is, in fact, a kernel (see A.9).
10 An Illustration: Ellsberg’s experiment
Not surprisingly, Ellsberg’s three-color urn experiment is the perfect example to
illustrate the concepts we have developed so far. In fact, the ingredients of the
model emerging from Theorem 2 and the issues related to those are all explicitly
there.
In the three-color urn experiment, a decision maker has to rank bets which
pay a certain amount of money depending on the color of a ball which is drawn
from an urn. He is told that the urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are red (R)
while the remaining are either blue (B) or green (G) in unknown proportion.
In our notation, the 90-ball urn is the set S, the domain of the bets. We
can think of it as a set with 90 points. The set of bets is the set of nonnegative
functions with the urn, S, as a domain. Σ, the coarsest σ-field which makes all
the bets measurable, is the power set of S. The set of models M is the set of all
possible configurations of the urn. Namely, the set of all possible combinations
of R, B and G that add up to 90.12 Finally, F+(M) (considered as a set) can
part II).
12As the reader might observe, this description could be enlarged by adding all the possible
permutations of the 90 balls. This is legitimate as, in principle, one could order the balls, and
give the decision maker information about such an ordering (for instance, “the 29th ball is
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be viewed as a system of hypothetical bets on the configuration of the urn. In
other words, these would be bets of the form, “I pay you $x if the number of
blue balls is 46 and I give you 0 otherwise”. Notice that these bets are diﬀerent
from the ones actually oﬀered to the decision maker. Moreover, the existence of
a relevant connection between the two system of bets is a subjective statement,
that is, it pertains to the decision maker himself.
In the experiment, the decision maker is told that the only possible config-
urations are those where the number of balls that are either blue or green is
60. We would like to stress that this is, explicitly, information about the set
of models and not about the domain of the bets. It is clear, however, that the
information is relevant for ranking the bets in F+(S). In particular, if the deci-
sion maker is going to use a probability measure on S, then he must make sure
that the probability of the event R ⊂ S is 1/3. Besides these obvious consid-
erations, it is not clear how the information about the set of models translates
into information about the domain of the bets. In fact, there is a piece missing
in our exposition: M, the σ-field on the set of models. Here, the question is
the following: in the three-color urn experiment, the information, “the number
of balls that are either blue or green is 60”, is the only information about the
possible configurations of the urn available to the decision maker. With M be-
ing the set of all such possible configurations, what σ-field on M describes this
information? We will have to introduce a number of additional concepts before
attacking this problem, and we will do so only in part II. For now, we want
to conclude our illustration by giving a continuous version of the three-color
experiment, which we use later in the work. In its continuous version, the urn
is identified to the interval [0, 1], which we should think of as partitioned into
three subsets, labeled R, B and G. The set of bets is
F+([0, 1]) = {f | f : [0, 1]→ R+, f bounded and Λ-measurable}
where Λ is the Lebesgue σ-algebra. The set of models,M , has the same meaning
as before, and is described by the set of probability measures on ([0, 1],Λ). The
decision maker’s information is about this set and not about the domain of the
bets. It takes the form, “the true model belongs to the subset Ω ⊂ ∆([0, 1])
such that µ(R) = 1/3 for every µ ∈ Ω”. This still begs the question of what is
the σ-field on the set of models which describes this information.
11 The Bayesian view
Having noticed that Ellsberg’s experiment fits the model of Theorem 2 perfectly,
it makes sense to examine the Bayesian argument stating that, even in our
context, the decision maker’s choices should conform to an expected utility
criterion.
red”). One can account for this possibility by proving a representation theorem like the one
above, but where the set ∆(S) is replaced by the set of automorphisms of the algebra Σ. We
will do so in part II when we study Ellsberg’s Paradox.
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Let us recall that the crucial features of the experiment are that (i) the
decision maker is uncertain about two objects, the domain of the bets and the
set of models; and (ii) he obtains information about the set of models and not
about the domain of the bets.
To begin, a Bayesian would argue that since the decision maker is uncertain
about the set of models, then such an uncertainty should be described by means
of a probability measure, P , on that set. This is tantamount to saying that the
decision maker obeys SEU for the system of hypothetical bets F+(M). The
set of models is a set of probability measures on S. Hence, the decision maker
would be described by a measure over those measures.
The next step is to argue that, when it comes to ordering the bets in
F+(S), the decision maker will compute the average of those measures using
the “weights” given by P . By doing so, he will end up with a single measure
on S, which describes his uncertainty. This is an old story. If a Bayesian deci-
sion maker is described by means of a measure P over a set of measures on the
domain of the acts, then he is equivalent, from an observational viewpoint, to
a Bayesian decision maker described by a single measure on the domain of the
acts. This measure is obtained by averaging out those measures, the weights
being given by P .
Assuming its validity, this reasoning has an important corollary, namely,
information about the set of models always translates into information about
the domain of the bets. In fact, if the Bayesian decision maker obtains some
information about the set of models, he will use it to compute a system of condi-
tional probabilities on that set, one for each element of the partition determined
by the information. Once this is done, he will apply the above reasoning, thus
obtaining, once again, a single measure on S.
While this type of reasoning is very popular, the conditions that guarantee
its validity are far from being trivially satisfied. In fact, the validity of this
reasoning is subject precisely to that informational requirement mentioned in
8.3. In part II, we study such conditions and show that, whenever they are not
satisfied, “rational” decision makers cannot conform to the choices postulated
by the SEU paradigm. Moreover, we will argue that the Ellsberg’s choices might
rationally emerge as a consequence of this fact.
12 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that virtually any axiomatic model of decision
making under uncertainty displays a certain structure. Such a structure involves
two sets — the set of models for the decision maker and the domain of the acts
— and allows us to think of the decision process as occurring in two stages. We
showed that this procedure can be thought of as describing a general form of
analogical reasoning.
The appearance, in any given choice problem, of the two diﬀerent sets im-
plies that the decision maker is uncertain about two diﬀerent objects and that
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he may receive information about any of them. This raises the issue of how
information about the set models aﬀects the decision maker’s ranking of the
available alternatives. This is the topic we study in the second part.
There, we focus on decision makers who satisfy the SEU paradigm if their
information on the set of models is suﬃciently fine. We then show, that the same
decision makers fail to obey the SEU paradigm in correspondence of coarser
information structures. We explicitly exhibit two such information structures,
and argue that one of them is naturally associated with Ellsberg’s three-color
urn experiment. We also use the properties of such information structures to
give a formal definition of Knightian Uncertainty.
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The concept of kernel is the building block of our definition of reasoning by
analogy. In fact, kernels play an important role throughout this work. Thus, it
is appropriate to gather here a few basic facts about them. For more, the reader
should consult [25].
Let (Y,Y) and (Y 0,Y 0) be two measurable spaces. A kernel from Y to Y 0 is
a mapping ν : F+(Y )→ F+(Y 0) which is
(i) aﬃne: ν(αf + βg) = αν(f) + βν(g), α, β ∈ R+
(ii) normal: fn % f =⇒ ν(fn)% ν(f), n ∈ N
In other words, a kernel is a representation (that is, a mapping which is
structure-preserving) of the positive measurable functions on Y into the positive
measurable functions on Y 0. Any kernel can be equivalently described by means
of a mapping, Y 0 → ∆+(Y ), from Y 0 to the set, ∆(Y ), of positive measures on
Y . In fact, one associates the element y0 ∈ Y 0 to the measure νy0 ∈ ∆(Y ), which
is defined by the equation
νy
0
(A) = (ν(χA)) (y
0), for every A ∈ Y
and the mapping
Y 0 → ∆+(Y ) defined by y0 7−→ νy0 (1)
is measurable in the sense that for every A ∈ Y, the function on Y 0 which takes
the value νy
0
(A) at the point y0 ∈ Y 0 is an element of F+(Y 0).
The converse of this is not necessarily true. While any mapping Y 0 → ∆(Y )
defines a mapping ν˜ : F+(Y ) → RY 0 , it is not guaranteed that range(ν˜) ⊂
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F+(Y 0). That is, ν˜ might fail to be measurable in the above sense. For instance,
given Y 0 → ∆(Y ), we can define ν˜ by
ν˜ : f 7−→ ν˜(f)







and it is clear that whether or not ν˜(f) is a measurable function on Y 0, i.e. is
an element of F+(Y 0), depends on the σ-algebra Y 0 that we have on Y 0. On the
other hand, it is immediate to check that if range(ν˜) ⊂ F+(Y 0), then ν˜ is aﬃne
and normal and, therefore, it is a kernel, and all kernels are defined essentially
in this way (see equation (2)).
A.6 Theorem 2
Recall that S is the domain of the acts, Σ is a fixed field of events in S and
X is the prize space. We assume that X is a convex set. As it is well-known,
such an assumption can be justified by thinking of X as the set of lotteries on
some given set of outcomes as in Anscombe and Aumann [1]. Alternatively, the
assumption can be justified on the basis of the axiomatization of preferences
given in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi [14].
Let F0 be the set of simple Σ-measurable acts (acts that take only finitely
many values in X) and let Fc be the set of constant acts. Let % be a binary
relation on F0, and let Â denote its asymmetric part.
Elements in the prize space are identified to the set of constant acts. Axioms
1 to 4 in the text imply the existence of a linear utility on the prize space. As
noticed (remark 3), this allows to identify acts with the set B0(S,W ) of bounded
Σ-measurable simple functions on S which take values inW = range(u). Gilboa
and Schmeidler [16] have shown that preferences satisfying A1 to A5 are rep-
resented by a functional I : B0(S,W ) → R which is C-independent, positively
homogeneous (which allows to extend by homogeneity I to the whole B0 — the
set of bounded Σ-measurable simple functions on S), monotone and supnorm
continuous. Finally, the latter property allows to extend I to the set of bounded
Σ-measurable functions on S as B0 is norm dense in the latter set.
Proof of Theorem 2. In [12], it was shown that I takes the form









for C a weak*-compact set of probability measures, α : F+(S)→ [0, 1] and u a
utility function on the prize space.
Set M = C ⊂ ∆(S), and letM be the Borel tribe generated by the weak*-
topology on ∆(S). Then, let κ be defined by f 7−→ κ(f) where
κ(f)(µ) =
Z
fdµ , µ ∈ ∆(S)
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Notice that C is measurable in ∆(S) because it is weak*-closed.
In order to prove the theorem, we need to show two things:
(i) κ is measurable in the sense of A.5.1, i.e. range(κ) ⊂ F+(C);
(ii) the function α : F+(S) → [0, 1] is compatible with the nucleous of
equivalence of κ, that is if f, g ∈ F+(S) are such that κ(f) = κ(g), then α(f) =
α(g). This will allow us to define α on F+(C) rather than on F+(S).
To prove (i) observe that the function κ(f) : ∆(S) → R+ is trivially con-
tinuous for the weak*-topology on ∆(S). Hence, it is measurable for the Borel
tribe generated by that topology.
(ii) was already observed by [12]. We provide here a slightly diﬀerent proof.
Let f, g ∈ F+(S) be such that κ(f) = κ(g). In the terminology of [12], this
implies that f is unambiguously indiﬀerent to g. Since unambiguous preference
is a subrelation of the decision maker’s preference relation over acts, this implies











we have α(f) = α(g).
A. 7 Theorems 4 to 6
Proof of Theorem 4. Axioms A1 and A3 to A5 restricted to constants im-
ply the existence of a utility function (not necessarily linear) on the prize space.
Axioms A3, A4 (see for instance Gilboa and Schmeidler [16], proof of Lemma
3.2) imply that for each f ∈ F0there exists xf ∈ X such that f ∼ xf . Define
J : F0 → R by J(f) = u(xf ). Clearly, J represents %. Set W = range(u). Let
B0(Σ,W ) denote the set of bounded, Σ-measurable simple functions with range
in W . The utility function u : X → R defines an operator Tu : F0 → B0(Σ,W )
by Tu(f) = u ◦ f . Define I : B0(Σ,W )→ R as the unique operator that makes
the diagram below commute
F0
Tu−→ B0(Σ,W )
J & ↓ I
R
B0(Σ,W ) is a subset of B0, the set of bounded, Σ-measurable simple functions.
B0 equipped with the supnorm is Banach space. Hence, it has suﬃciently many
continuous linear functionals. That is, if a, b ∈ B0, a 6= b, there exists a contin-
uous linear functionals L on B0 such that L(a) 6= L(b). By Riesz representation
theorem, a continuous linear functional on B0 has the form
R
adµ, with µ a
finitely additive measure on Σ. Hence, the mapping κ : B0(Σ,W ) → F (∆(S))
defined as in the statement of the proposition is one-to-one. As observed in the
proof of the previous theorem, κ(a) is a measurable function on (M = ∆(S),M)
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withM being the Borel tribe generated by the weak*-topology. Finally, define
V as the unique functional that makes the following diagram commute
B0(Σ,W )
κ−→ F+(M,M)
I & ↓ V
R
Proof of Corollary 5. Axioms A1, A4 and AAC imply the existence a
a real-valued utility on the prize space. CE implies that for each f ∈ F0there
exists xf ∈ X such that f ∼ xf . Define J : F0 → R by J(f) = u(xf ). Clearly,
J represents %. Then, proceed as in the above proof.
Proof of Theorem 6. By A1, A4 restricted to constants and LC, the
set X along with the order and the mixture operations is a (non-Archimedean)
utility space in the sense on Hausner [22]. Hausner [22] and Hausner and Wendel
[23] have shown that there exists an order-preserving embedding u˜ (a utility, not
real-valued) of X into an ordered vector space OV . Denote by ≥ the order on
OV .
Define a norm |·| on OV , and denote by OV ∗ its completion. That is, OV ∗
is a Banach space. By embedding OV into OV ∗, each act f ∈ F0 is associated
to the mapping u˜ ◦ f from S to the Banach space OV ∗. For each f ∈ F0,
u˜ ◦ f is measurable and, being a simple function, is strongly measurable. Let
F0(S,OV ∗) be the set of all measurable simple mappings S → OV ∗.
Endow F0(S,OV ∗) with the norm defined by
kfk = {sup |f(s)| : s ∈ S} , f ∈ F0(S,OV ∗)
Since OV ∗ is a Banach space so is F0(S,OV ∗).
By CE (proceeding just like in the previous two proofs), there exists a map-
ping J : F0 → OV ∗ such that f % g iﬀ J(f) ≥ J(g).
For µ ∈ ∆(S) and a ∈ F0(S,OV ∗), denote by
R
adµ the Bochner integral
(see for instance [5]).
On M = ∆(S), we define a topology τ as the coarsest topology such that
for any bounded strongly measurable function b : S → OV ∗





Let B be the Borel tribe generated by τ and let F (∆(S), OV ∗) be the space of
measurable mappings M → OV ∗ (these are the mappings that are measurable
with respect to B and the Borel tribe generated by the norm topology on OV ∗).
Define κ : f 7−→ φf as in the statement of the theorem. The mapping is
clearly injective [If f, g ∈ F0(S,OV ∗) and f 6= g then (since they are both
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simple) there exists A ∈ Σ such that f(s) = x ∈ OV ∗ and g(s) = y ∈ OV ∗for
any s ∈ A and x 6= y. Pick µ ∈ ∆(S) so that µ(A) = 1. Then, R fdµ 6=R
gdµ]. Moreover, for each f ∈ F0(S,OV ∗) the mapping φf is continuous for
the topology τ and, hence, measurable. Hence, range(κ) ⊂ F (∆(S), OV ∗).
A. 9 A Borel setting
A.9.1 Standard Spaces
A Polish space, (X, τ), is a separable, completely metrizable topological
space. Given the topology τ on X, the Borel σ—field is the one generated by the
closed sets.
A Standard Borel space is a Polish space stripped down to its Borel structure.
Let X and Y be two measurable spaces. A mapping X → Y is called a
Borel isomorphism if it is a bijection and is bimeasurable. An important and
well-known fact about standard Borel spaces is stated in the following theorem
(see [33], Theorem 3.3.13)
Theorem 7 (Borel isomorphism theorem) Any two uncountable standard
Borel spaces are Borel isomorphic.
A Standard Borel space along with a nonatomic measure is a called a Stan-
dard Lebesgue space.
In part II, we will often use the well-known fact that the reduced Borel
measure algebra on [0, 1] (Borel sets modulo Borel sets of measure zero) and the
reduced Lebesgue measure algebra on [0, 1] (Lebesgue sets modulo Lebesgue
sets of measure zero) are the same (see [20], p.68).
A.9.2 Monotone Continuity
In [12], Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci introduced the following re-
lation on F , which they termed unambiguous preference relation.
Definition 8 ([12]) Let f, g ∈ F . f is unambiguously preferred to g, f %∗ g,
if
λf + (1− λ)h % λg + (1− λ)h
for all λ ∈ (0, 1) and h ∈ F .
As shown in [12] (Sec. B.3), for a preference relation satisfying A1 to A5,
the following axiom is equivalent to the property that all the priors in the
representation are countably additive.
A6 (Monotone Continuity) For all x, y, z ∈ X such that y Â∗ z, and all
sequences of events {An}n≥1 ⊆ Σ with An ↓ ∅, there exists n¯ ∈ N such that
y Â∗ xAn¯z.
The introduction of Axiom 6 allows us to conclude that the mapping κ in
Theorem 2 is a kernel. In fact, it is immediate that κ is aﬃne. Without Axiom
6, this is all we can say. In particular, we cannot conclude that κ is normal
because with finitely additive measure the Dominated Convergence Theorem
need not hold. However, with Axiom 6, all the measures in the theorem are
countably additive. Hence, since every f is bounded, it is immediate to verify
that κ is normal.
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